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The Central-Local Relationship and Constitutional Operations in France

Received: 24 February 2016     Accepted: 2 March 2016     Published: 12 March 2016
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Abstract

This paper argues that the French model of Semi-presidentialism shows two features. One the one hand, the President is the head of both the central government and local affairs due to France’s historical background as a highly centralized state. On the other hand, the political struggle between the local executive heads and the central government influences not only the Executive power, but also the Executive-Legislative interaction from the bottom. Moreover, the Constitutional Amendment in 2008, in which the Presidential and the Parliamentary powers were reinforced, makes the central-local relationship a key to estimating the future development of the Constitutionalism in France.

Published in Humanities and Social Sciences (Volume 4, Issue 2)
DOI 10.11648/j.hss.20160402.11
Page(s) 16-25
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2016. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Semi-presidentialism, France, Paris, Central-Local Relationship

References
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  • APA Style

    Chun-Hao Chang. (2016). The Central-Local Relationship and Constitutional Operations in France. Humanities and Social Sciences, 4(2), 16-25. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hss.20160402.11

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    ACS Style

    Chun-Hao Chang. The Central-Local Relationship and Constitutional Operations in France. Humanit. Soc. Sci. 2016, 4(2), 16-25. doi: 10.11648/j.hss.20160402.11

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    AMA Style

    Chun-Hao Chang. The Central-Local Relationship and Constitutional Operations in France. Humanit Soc Sci. 2016;4(2):16-25. doi: 10.11648/j.hss.20160402.11

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  • @article{10.11648/j.hss.20160402.11,
      author = {Chun-Hao Chang},
      title = {The Central-Local Relationship and Constitutional Operations in France},
      journal = {Humanities and Social Sciences},
      volume = {4},
      number = {2},
      pages = {16-25},
      doi = {10.11648/j.hss.20160402.11},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hss.20160402.11},
      eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.hss.20160402.11},
      abstract = {This paper argues that the French model of Semi-presidentialism shows two features. One the one hand, the President is the head of both the central government and local affairs due to France’s historical background as a highly centralized state. On the other hand, the political struggle between the local executive heads and the central government influences not only the Executive power, but also the Executive-Legislative interaction from the bottom. Moreover, the Constitutional Amendment in 2008, in which the Presidential and the Parliamentary powers were reinforced, makes the central-local relationship a key to estimating the future development of the Constitutionalism in France.},
     year = {2016}
    }
    

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    T1  - The Central-Local Relationship and Constitutional Operations in France
    AU  - Chun-Hao Chang
    Y1  - 2016/03/12
    PY  - 2016
    N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hss.20160402.11
    DO  - 10.11648/j.hss.20160402.11
    T2  - Humanities and Social Sciences
    JF  - Humanities and Social Sciences
    JO  - Humanities and Social Sciences
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    UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.hss.20160402.11
    AB  - This paper argues that the French model of Semi-presidentialism shows two features. One the one hand, the President is the head of both the central government and local affairs due to France’s historical background as a highly centralized state. On the other hand, the political struggle between the local executive heads and the central government influences not only the Executive power, but also the Executive-Legislative interaction from the bottom. Moreover, the Constitutional Amendment in 2008, in which the Presidential and the Parliamentary powers were reinforced, makes the central-local relationship a key to estimating the future development of the Constitutionalism in France.
    VL  - 4
    IS  - 2
    ER  - 

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Author Information
  • Department of Political Science, Tunghai University, Taichung, Taiwan

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